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ABSTRACT
Network  has grows  to  a  mammoth size  and  becoming more 
complex, thus exposing the services it offers towards multiple  
types  of  intrusion  vulnerabilities.  One  method  to  overcome 
intrusion is by introducing Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for  
detecting  the  threat  before  it  can  damage  the  network  
resources. IDS have the ability to analyze network traffic and 
recognize incoming and on-going network attack. In detecting 
intrusion attack, Information gathering on such activity can be 
classified into fast attack and slow attack. Yet, majority of the  
current intrusion detection systems do not have the ability to 
differentiate between these two types of attacks. Early detection 
of fast attack is very useful in a real time environment; in which 
it  can help the  targeted  network  from further  intrusion  that  
could let the intruder to gain access to the vulnerable machine.  
To address this challenge, this paper introduces a fast attack 
detection framework that set a threshold value to differentiate  
between  the  normal  network  traffic  and  abnormal  network 
traffic on the victim perspective. The threshold value is abstract  
with  the  help  of  suitable  set  of  feature  used  to  detect  the 
anomaly in the network.  By introducing the threshold value,  
anomaly based detection can build a complete profile to detect  
any intrusion threat as well as at the same time reducing it false 
alarm alert. 
Keywords: Intrusion detection system, fast attack, Statistical  
Process control.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Since  the  development  of  internet  in  1969  networks  have 
grown in both size and importance. The Internet which is also 
known as the TCP/IP networks has become the mean to share 
and distribute information. It also can be exploited to attack a 
host. Nowadays, attacks are becoming easier to launch as the 
tool is easily obtained and the attack itself has becoming more 
sophisticated.  In order  to overcome the attack,  one needs to 
understand the phases an attacker take to launched it activity. 
Intrusion  attack  involved  five  phases  which  are 
reconnaissance,  scanning,  gaining access,  maintaining access 
and covering tracks (CEH, 2005). 
The first two phases are considered as the initial stage of 
an attack,  whereby  both  of  the  phases  is  used to collect 
information on the vulnerability  of  the targeted machine. 
The information gain can be either be the services offer on 
the network,  the port  open and type of operating  system 
used.  The  result  of  the  finding  will  help  the  attacker  to 
decide  what  tool  to  use  in the  next  phase  of  the  attack. 
These phases can be classified into two categories which 
are fast attack and slow attack. Fast attack is defined as an 
attack  that  uses  a  large  amount  of  packet  or  connection 
within a few seconds (Lazarevic et al, 2003) and the slow 
attack is considered as an attack that takes a few minutes or 
a few hours to complete. Existing detection system such as 
Snort  (Softfire  inc.,  2007)  and  Bro  (V.Paxson,  1999) 
combine  fast  attack  and  slow  attack  detection  into  one 
module, this may cause late detection especially for the fast 
attack. Early detection is needed to prevent a more serious 
damage to a vulnerable  network,  by reducing the further 
step in attacks; the losses due to the security breach can be 
minimized.
This  paper  presents  a novel  framework  on detecting  fast 
attack that focusing on the number of connection made by 
an attacker towards a single victim at the initial stage of the 
attack. By focusing on this information, administrators will 
have valuable information regarding the level of security of 
the  compromised  machine.  Therefore  investigating  and 
make  necessary  action  is  a  must  to  secure  the  machine 
from future attack. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is structured  as  follows.  Section  2 
discuses the background of fast attack framework, Section 
3  presents  the  methodologies  and  the  technique  use  in 
creating the fast attack module. Section 4 elaborates on the 
result  validation.  Finally,  section 5 conclude  and discuss 
the future directions of this work.
2.0 BACKGROUND
Similar worked on fast attack has been done but most are 
concentrating  on  detecting  fast  attack  based  on  specific 
attack such as worm, scanning and Denial of service (Dos) 
or  Distributed  Dos  (DDos).  Worked  done  by  Xio  et  al. 
(2005) only consider TCP-SYN flag in their investigation 
to detect DDos attack. Whereas Zou et al (2006) used Kalman 
Filter estimation  algorithm in detecting code  red and blaster 
worm using simulation approach. Robertson et al. (2003) and 
Bro  (V.Paxson,  1999)  both  are  focusing  on  the  failed 
connection  attempts.  Whereas  snort  uses  portscan2  scan-
detection  preprocessor,  which  take  into  account  distinct 
connection  rather  than TCP-SYN packet  (Jung et.  al.  2004). 
Hence, it may generate a lot of misclassification in a case of a 
single host sends multiple SYNs in the same failed connection 
attempts.
2.1 Fast Attack Framework
By analyzing the nature of an attack, criteria such as number 
of new connection and derived features can be used to detect 
the fast attack.  Shahrin et.  al.(2007a) have proposed the fast 
attack detection novel framework as depicted in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Framework of Fast attack detection
From the framework  the attack  is divided into 2 categories, 
which are Attacker and Victim. In the attacker perspective, the 
attack is caused by a single host and to make it more reliable it 
is divided into 2 subcategories to make it more reliable. The 
host subcategories or AAH is to detect  any attack originated 
from single host that targeted multiple hosts such as scanning 
attack.  Meanwhile  the  subcategories  Service  or  AAS  is 
referring to detection of an attack towards the services offered 
by  victim.  This  paper  will  concentrate  on  the  Victim 
perspective, in which it focuses on number of host connected 
to  the  single  destination  host.  As  a  result,  any  compromise 
from any host to the victim (destination) may be detected. 
2.2 Features selection
The success of an Intrusion Detection System depends on the 
decision upon a set of features that the system is going to use 
for detecting the attacker especially the fast attacks. Different 
researchers use different names for the same subset of feature 
while others use the same name but different types (Onut and 
Ghorbani, 2006). Understanding the relationship as well as the 
influence  of  the  features  in  detecting  the  fast  attack  is 
necessary  to  avoid  any  redundant  features  selected  for  the 
intrusion detection system. Shahrin et al. (2007a) constructed a 
minimum set  of  features  by integrating  the new features 
and  features  from  the  KDDCUP99  (1999),  in  order  to 
detect  the fast  attack  from the perspective  of  the victim. 
Table 1 describe the features involve in this research. 
Table 1: Feature selection
Dst_count  is  generated  using  the  frequency  episode 
technique as this technique can discover what time-based 
sequence  of  audit  events  frequently  occur  together  (Lee 
and  Stolfo,  2004).  Analyzing  the  relationship  between 
features  is  also  important  to  reduce  the  selection  of  the 
features  because  some  features  may  cause  or  contain 
negative  correlation  (Chebrolu,  Abraham  and  Thomas, 
2004). This research found that by using these features, the 
system  is  still  capable  of  detecting  fast  attack  with  a 
minimum false  alarm.  Furthermore,  it  also can speed up 
the detection time especially in detecting the fast attack. 
2.3 Threshold analysis
There are two techniques that can be used in selecting the 
appropriate  threshold  to  distinguish  between  the  normal 
network  traffic  and  abnormal  network  traffic.  The 
techniques  are  static  threshold  value  and  dynamic 
threshold value. Dynamic threshold value requires training 
or  priori  knowledge  of  the  network  activity  before  the 
threshold is selected (Idika and Mathur, 2007). Generating 
priori  knowledge  require  human  expert  and  is  time 
consuming since network traffic contains huge amount of 
information  and  the  complexity  involves  protocol  which 
requires an in depth knowledge of human expert to analyze 
it (Mellia et al, 2006). Therefore,  this research will focus 
on static threshold value because selecting static threshold 
is very useful  to prevent the intrusion activity before the 
attacker  begins  to  launch  the  attack  (Idika  and  Mathur, 
2007). 
Moreover,  static  threshold  has  been  widely  used  by 
commercial  products  in  detecting  the  attacker  in  the 
network.  Netscreen  IDS  developed  by  Juniper  (Juniper, 
2007)  also  adopted  the  static  threshold  inside  the 
configuration  to  tackle  the  Denial  of  Service  activity. 
Feature Description Category
Timestamp Time the packet was send
Duration Duration of connection.
IP Addresses of host
Protocol type Connection protocol (e.g tcp)
Flag Status flag of the connection
Service Source and Destination 
services.
Basic Features
Dest_count Number of connection having 
the same destination host 
(AVC).
Derived Features
Attack (A)
Attacker (A) Victim (V)
Host(H) Service(S) Connection(C)
Commercial  IDS,  the  most  popular  intrusion  detection 
software  such  as  Bro  (Bro,  2007)  and  Snort  (Softfire  Inc., 
2007) still uses the static threshold mechanism to identify the 
attacker. As stated earlier in this paper, the drawback of these 
products is the implementation of both the fast attack and slow 
attack in one module which can slow the detection process. 
Other research such as Gates and Damon (2005), Ye and Chen 
(2001)  and  Leckie  et  al,  (2002)  also  used  static  threshold 
mechanism in identifying the attacker. However most of them 
are  focuses  more  on  the  individual  attack  rather  than  the 
behavior  attacks  and  the  analysis  only  concentrates  on  the 
detection technique rather than revealing the feature influence. 
Furthermore,  none  of  the  previous  researcher  proposed  a 
proper technique to identify the static threshold. Most of them 
used  observation  technique  without  asserting  a  clear 
explanation on the selection of the static threshold using the 
observation technique. To overcome all these weaknesses, this 
research determined the static threshold using the observation 
technique  combined  with  experiment  to  identify  the 
appropriate threshold for the victim category. The result of the 
observation  technique  is  then  validated  using  Statistical 
Process Control (SPC).
3.0 IMPLEMENTATION
This section will describe the methodology, techniques and the 
statistical approach used. Python Software Foundation (2007) 
and  shell  scripting  is  used  to  develop  the  platform  and  the 
underlying  operation  system  is  Linux.  The  system  was 
designed in such a way so that it can work and extract feature 
under real time traffic environment.
3.1 Methodology
The  main  module  for  the  fast  attack  detection  is  depicted 
Figure 2. The traffic  is captured by TCPdump (2007) and the 
information  from  the  tcpdump  is  processed  through  the 
Feature  Extraction,  Time  Based,  and  Threshold  Detection 
module. 
Figure 2: Fast attack main module.
The Feature extraction module separated the file into their 
respective protocol such as TCP, UDP and ICMP. For TCP 
protocol, this project excluded services from port 80, 443, 
135  until  139.  Next,  the  module  sends  the  data  as  a 
continuous  stream  to  Time  Based  Module.  Time  Based 
Module calculate  the statistic of the frequent event occur 
between 1 second  time interval  for  each  number of  host 
connected to a single destination host. 
The  next  module  is  the  threshold  module,  which  is  the 
backbone  of  the  fast  attack  detection  from  the  victim 
perspective. Choosing the right threshold is very important 
to this research, selecting too low, may generate excessive 
false positive while too high, will cause the system to miss 
less aggressive scanner.  The next section will discuss  on 
the  techniques  used  by  this  research  in  determining  the 
threshold value. The output of this module determined the 
real traffic and the anomalous traffic.
3.2 Observation and Experiment Techniques
The observation is done on real network traffic from one of 
the  government  agency  site.  The  purpose  of  the 
observation is to identify the average connection made by 
host  or  hosts  to  single  victim  within  one  second  time 
interval.  By  doing  this,  the  connection  made  to  single 
victim can be identified.  The result from the observation 
technique will be compared to select the appropriate static 
threshold for the fast attack detection. Meanwhile, for the 
experiment  technique,  a small  local  area network  (LAN) 
has been setup, refer figure 3. The experiment consists of 
multiple  operating  systems  such  as  Windows  XP 
Professional  Service  Pack  2,  Windows  Vista  and  Linux 
CentOS Version 4.4. 
Figure 3: Experimental setup
The  purpose  of  the experiment  is  to identify  the normal 
connection  made by each of  operating  system.  By doing 
this,  the normal  behavior  of host  in transmitting  network 
packet  to  the  destination  host  within  one  second  time 
interval is identified. The result from each of the operating 
system will  be  captured  and  compared  with  each  other. 
Another  comparison  process  will  be  done  between  the 
result from the observation and result from the experiment. 
The comparison result will be used to select an appropriate 
threshold for the fast attack detection. After selecting the 
threshold,  the  verification  process  using  the  SPC  model 
TCPDUMP File
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Result
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will  be  done  to  validate  the  threshold  selection  from  the 
observation and experiment before using it inside the real time 
environment.
3.3 Statistical Process Control
SPC  is  a  powerful  tool  for  achieving  process  stability  and 
improving capability through the reduction of variability. The 
major objective of a statistical control chart is quick to detect 
the occurrence  of assignable  causes or process shifts so that 
investigation  of  the  process  and  corrective  action  may  be 
undertaken  before  many  nonconforming  units  are 
manufactured  (Montgomery  and  George,  2007).  Due  to  the 
fast attack which needs to be detected as quickly as possible, 
therefore a statistical control chart is deemed suitable used in 
this  research.  Furthermore,  a  statistical  control  chart  can  be 
used  to  verify  the  threshold  selection  before  using  the 
threshold in real time environment for detecting the fast attack.
The general model for the control  chart is introduced by Dr. 
Walter A. Shewart (Montgomery and George, 2007). Let P be 
a  sample  statistic  that  measures  the  quality  characteristic  of 
interest, and the mean of P is µ   and the standard deviation of 
P is  σ  .The  center  line,  the  upper  control  limit  and  lower 
control limit equation is stated in (1).
UCL = µ + kσ
CL = µ
LCL = µ - kσ                             (1)
Where  k is the distance  of  the control  limit from the center 
line.  The  k  value  is  also  used  by  Ye  et  al,  (2001)  in  their 
research in detecting the intrusion activity based on audit trail. 
In  this  research  the  value  of  k  equal  to  3  and  is  used  for 
developing the Shewhart control chart. 
The chart contain a center line (CL) that represent the 
average value of the quality characteristic corresponding to the 
in-control  stated. The two others horizontal  lines indicate the 
upper control  limit (UCL) and lower control  limit  (LCL).  If 
there are points which exceed the control limit, these indicate 
that the point is out of control. During the research the output 
from the time based module will be used to construct the SPC 
chart.  The threshold value selected from the experiment  and 
observation will be used as a mean for constructing the SPC 
chart. The mean value indicate the normal behavior of network 
traffic inside the network. If the number of connection to the 
single destination host exceeds the value of normal threshold, 
then it will recognize that there is an abnormal behavior in the 
network.
4.0 RESULT VALIDATION.
In  this  research,  the  observation  and  the  experimental 
techniques are concentrated on port 21, 25, 53, 110, 135, 139, 
and 445. Port 25 and 110 has been selected because these ports 
are  important  for  sending  and  receiving  emails. 
Furthermore,  both  this  ports  are  easily  compromised  by 
spamming activity  and  the incident  cases  from the spam 
activity are increases every year (MyCert,  2008). Port  53 
called as Domain Name Service (DNS) is selected because 
this  port  is  important  to  resolution  process  especially  in 
determining the IP address to a name of a host (Nemeth et 
al,  2002).  Protecting  DNS is also important  because  any 
single failure to DNS root server or any DNS queries may 
result  in  catastrophic  consequences  (Wang  et  al,  2003). 
Port 21, 135, 139 and 445 is the most popular port that is 
used  by  worm  activity  to  compromise  the  host 
(Cybersecurity,  2008).  Therefore,  it  has  been selected  as 
one of the port for observation. 
4.1 Observation and Experimental result.
The  observation  technique  will  identify  the  average 
number of connection  made to single victim within time 
interval of one second. The observation of network traffic 
is  based  on  the  well  known  port  which  has  been  used 
inside this research. The reason behind the selection of the 
well known port has been discussed earlier. By identifying 
the average number of connection made to a single victim, 
the  pattern  of  traffic  made  by  host  to  private  port  on  a 
single  victim  was  discovered.  This  result  may  help  to 
distinguish between the normal and abnormal behavior of 
the  network  traffic.  Besides  the  observation  technique, 
simple local  area network  was also setup to discover  the 
pattern  of  network  traffic  for  a  host  from  different 
operating  system.  Understanding  the  pattern  of  network 
traffic  from  different  operating  system  may  help  to 
distinguish the normal  and abnormal  connection made by 
single  host  to  single  victim  within  one  second  time 
interval.
The  observation  techniques  encompass  the  mean, 
minimum connection per second and maximum number of 
connection made by hosts or host to a single victim. Table 
2  shows  the  summary  of  the  result  taken  from the  real 
traffic  Site,  from  the  table,  the  average  number  of 
connection  per  second  for  each  port  falls  within  one 
connection  per  second.  Only  two  ports  exceed  three 
connections  per second which are port  135 and port  139. 
By referring the technical report, this site was flooded with 
worm  generated  from  port  135  and  139  (Shahrin  et  al, 
2007b). Therefore the number of connection per second for 
port  135 and port 139 to single victim can be reached to 
127  connections  per  second  and  155  connections  per 
second  for  each  port  respectively.  As  a  conclusion,  one 
connection  per  second  can  be  chosen  as  a  temporary 
threshold for the observation techniques.
Table 2: Average Connection for Site B
Port Number Mean of Minimum Maximum 
connection per 
second
connection per 
second
connection per 
second
21 1.33 1 2
25 1.02 1 2
53 1.05 1 3
110 1 1 1
135 30.52 1 127
139 28.71 1 155
445 1.14 1 3
The  experiment  was  done  by  capturing  the  network  traffic 
generated by each of the operating system as depicted in figure 
3.  The  victim  host  installed  with  CentOS  4.4  and  used  to 
capture all the network traffic to the victim host. The network 
traffic  for  each  of  the  operating  system will  be  read  using 
TCPdump application and the traffic flow will be identified. 
The  traffic  flow will  be  analyzed  to identify  the number  of 
connection  made  by  each  operating  system  to  a  single 
destination host. By doing this, the normal behavior of host in 
transmitting network packet to the destination host within one 
second time interval is identified and the average value obtain 
from the experiment  is 3.  The experiment  result is shown in 
table 3:
Table 3: Experimental result
Operating System Number of Connection Per 
second
Windows  XP  Professionals  Service 
Pack 2 (Fresh Install) 
3
Windows Vista 3
Windows  XP  Professionals  Service 
Pack 2
3
Linux CentOS 4.4 1
Solaris 10 1
From the  observation  technique  result  and  the  experimental 
result the average connection to a single host is in the range of 
1 until 3 connections Therefore 3 connections per second can 
be considered as a normal connection and if the connection is 
more  than 3 we can considered  it  as  an abnormal  behavior. 
Now the threshold selected can be verified using the Statistical 
Process Control.
4.2 Threshold Verification 
The  threshold  verification  is  based  on  the  data  from  the 
observation  technique.  The  Shewhart  Control  Chart  is 
contructed  based  on  the  well  known  port  inside  the 
observation site. The value for the Upper Control Limit (UCL) 
and  Lower  Control  Limit  will  be  computed  based  on  the 
equation (8).  The mean value used is referred to the normal 
threshold connection per second which is 3. It means that any 
connection  that  exceeds  the  normal  threshold  value  is 
suspected as attack traffic.  After the Shewhart  Control  Chart 
has been generated,  any  connection  that  exceeds the normal 
threshold will be examined manually to identify the accuracy 
of the selected threshold. If there is no connection per second 
which  exceeds  the  normal  threshold  value,  then  it  can  be 
concluded  that  all  the  connections  are  following  a  normal 
behavior of the network traffic. From figure 4, port 21, 25, 
53 and 110 shows a normal traffic as all the connections to 
this  port  is  under  the  control  limit  and  mean  value. 
Whereas port 135, 139 and 445 have a connection over the 
control  limit,  based  on  the  observation  from  the  actual 
network  traffic,  the  point  is  come  from one  of  the  host 
which  generates  excessive  network  traffic  to  multiple 
victim host on port 135, 139 and 445 and referring to the 
technical  report  done  by  (Shahrin  et  al,  2007b)  on  the 
observation  site,  shows  that  the  hosts  have  been 
compromised  by  worm  activity.  There  are  other  hosts 
which  have  been  infected  by  worm  and  generated 
excessive network traffic to port 445. The total number of 
victims has been infected is 6 and the threshold managed to 
predict 5 out of 6. The false alarm generated at the victim 
is  not  a  false  alarm.  It  is  because  from  the  attacker 
perspective,  the  host  who  initiate  the  connection  is 
considered  as  attacker  because  this  host  generated 
excessive  network  traffic  to  other  victim.  Based  on  the 
result, it shows that most of the host infected by worm will 
generate  more  than  3 packets  per  second.  Therefore,  the 
threshold  selected  may  be  useful  to  identify  the  worm 
activity  as  fast  as  possible  since  the  objective  of  the 
research is to identify the fast attack. 
(a) Port 21 (b) Port 25
(c) Port 110 (d) Port 135
(e) Port 139 (f) Port 53
(g) Port 445
Figure 4: SPC chart for port (a) 21, (b) 25, (c) 110, (d) 135, (e) 
139, (f) 53, (g) 445.
5. 0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK.
The current work presents a framework in detecting fast attack 
from  the  victim  perspective  and  introduced  a  minimum 
features  that  can  be  used  to  detect  fast  attack.  In  order  to 
determine a threshold value that  can be used to differentiate 
normal and abnormal network traffic, this new technique has 
incorporated observation technique combined with experiment 
and  the  finding  is  then  verified  using  Statistical  Process 
Control  approach.  Using a real  network traffic data and data 
from the  experiment  setup,  the  research  has  introduced  this 
new technique  to be used to determine  a threshold  value to 
detect fast attack from the victim perspective.
For the future work, we would like to obtain normal network 
traffic behavior data based on network traffic simulation using 
the data from DARPA99. The result is then going to be used to 
validate the result obtains from the observation technique and 
experiment  of this research.  The next phase we will run the 
system  on  real-time  network  traffic  to  evaluate  the 
effectiveness of the system in detecting fast attack in real time. 
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